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1. Summary
Much of Professor Donia’s report represents an unimpeachable scholarly 
consensus and I have not attempted to repeat points of agreement.  However, 
I disagree with key points in his argument both on the historical identity of 
Bosnia and on specific developments in the period leading up to the collapse 
of Socialist Federal Yugoslavia in 1991 and in the two years afterwards.
The thesis of a historical continuity of Bosnian identity and even shadow 
statehood from pre-Ottoman times (i.e., before 1463) until 1991 is seriously 
flawed.  At best it represents a benign parallel to the historical continuity 
theses of Serb and Croat nationalist historians usually reviled and certainly 
rejected by most Western scholars.
The modern northern and western borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina were 
not those of medieval Bosnia.  They represent the geo-strategic stand-off 
between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires.  Boundaries in the medieval 
period were far from clear-cut as they became in post-Westphalian Europe. 
Fluidity of identities, allegiances and sovereignty were the norm until the 
Ottoman conquest in the case of Bosnia when an unprecedented state-system 
established itself in the Balkans.
Whatever peculiarities Bosnia may have possessed under Ottoman hegem-
ony, its most obvious particularity — the conversion of a large number of its 
inhabitants to Islam — was wholly dependent on Ottoman conquest.  This 
phenomenon was not specific to Bosnia but also involved Slavs and other pre-
Ottoman conquest peoples elsewhere, most significantly in the neighbouring 
Sandñak of Novi Pazar. 
Bosnian Muslim identity extended (and extends) beyond Bosnia-
Herzegovina into especially the Sandžak region between Serbia and 
Montenegro.  If it were accepted that Bosnian Muslim identity implied a com-
mon community, then Bosnia-Herzegovina would have territorial claims out-
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side its internationally-recognised republican borders upon an area of Serbia 
whose population is about 80% self-declared Muslim — i.e., circa twice the 
Muslim percentage of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Of course just as it seems natural for Sandñak Muslims to form their own 
branch of the SDA so Bosnian Croats regarded party allegiances to HDZ in 
particular but to other parties with “big brothers” in Croatia as normal. 
The cross-boundary fluidity of identity in former Yugoslavia, most of all 
Bosnia-Herzegovina makes efforts to confine political allegiances solely with-
in the republic on the part of all ethno-religious groups unrealistic, and even 
undemocratic.
Although efforts have been made to emphasise the existence of a separate 
Bosniac language distinct from both Serbian and Croatian, these rely on exag-
gerating vocabulary differences and parallel the usually discredited nationalis-
tic attempts to purify Croatian Serbian of common vocabulary.  
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a specific Bosnian identity is pri-
marily based on a religious criterion (even where practice of Islam has lapsed) 
just as Croatian identity is bound up with Catholicism.
Unlike the strong Serbian tradition of viewing the Bosnian Muslims as ren-
egades and decrying them as traitors, dominant Croatian attitudes to Bosnian 
Muslims were never profoundly hostile.  Indeed at least in rhetoric even the 
most extreme Croatian nationalists in the twentieth century, the Ustasha, 
emphasised the “purity” of the Croatian roots of the Bosnian Muslims.  This 
was certainly a myth but it was hardly the most negative one in the Ustasha 
armoury.
Statements by President Tudjman decrying the perceived danger of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina ought to be seen in the context of 
more recent developments.  Several of the SDA leaders had been educated in 
radical Arab states hostile to the West into which Tudjman wanted to integrate. 
Rightly or (probably) wrongly Tudjman saw them as facilitating the influence 
of the mujhadeen.  If we recall how many US commentators and even the CIA 
has warned about the potential influence of Islamic fundamentalists in Bosnia 
and other parts of the Balkans — a fear I regard as greatly exaggerated — then 
Tudjman’s attitude does not appear abnormal or particularly sinister.
Many people (both inside and outside the former Yugoslavia) may feel in 
retrospect that the break up of the former Yugoslavia was a mistake and worked 
to the disadvantage of the majority of its people(s), but neither the former 
Yugoslavia (in its various incarnations since 1918) nor Bosnia-Herzegovina 
as a republic or independent state achieved the status of a political institution 
which could appeal to the unthinking loyalty of the vast bulk of its population 
in the way that Denmark or the United States obviously do. 
Imagining different futures than the dissolution of Federal Socialist 
Yugoslavia into its component republics as international state entities was not 
unnatural nor treasonable.  As I have shown all participants in the break-up of 
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Yugoslavia, including international mediators, contemplated a variety of out-
comes, including the Bosnian Muslim leadership. 
Only by ignoring the multi-layered and frequently self-contradictory proc-
ess of the dissolution of old Yugoslavia is it possible to see a consistent and pre-
determined scheme by the Croatian HDZ to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina at 
the expense of its Muslim inhabitants. 
To reinforce my argument that the charges of a deep-laid conspiracy linking 
President Tudjman, and a chain of members of the HDZ in both Croatia and 
Bosnia to a sinister and criminal plot to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina in col-
lusion with President Milošević of Serbia, I have cited a number of scholarly 
experts on former Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina — Dr. Noel 
Malcolm, Dr. Christopher Cviić, and Professor Ivo Banac — whose criticism of 
other aspects of President Tudjman’s policies and  political activism in opposi-
tion parties and press (in the cases of Cviić and Banac) make their rejection of 
this charge all the more powerful. 
Professor Donia seems to interpret the developments of the HDZ in Bosnia-
Herzegovina in too simplistic a manner on the back of a notion of a pre-con-
ceived plan of aggression by President Tudjman.  I hope that I have shown that 
HDZ policy was far from mono-linear. 
By neglecting aspects of Muslim policy, Professor Donia and the Prosecution 
put these developments in a false light. 
Acknowledging that President Izetbegović and his colleagues in the SDA 
found themselves in a potentially tragic situation in 1991-92 in the run-up 
to what we now know was Bosnia-Herzegovina’s declaration of independ-
ence should not blind us to the fact that several of their actions and aspects 
of deliberate inaction in the period of the war against Croatia by the JNA and 
local Serb forces July-December, 1991, and in the run-up to independence led 
both Croats inside Bosnia-Herzegovina and inside Croatia itself to doubt the 
reliability of the Muslim leadership vis-à-vis Belgrade. 
Bosnian Croat preparations for self-defence take on a very different appear-
ance when it is remembered that President Izetbegović’s authorities had not 
attempted to inhibit the operations of the JNA from Bosnian territory against 
Croatia in 1991, and that they had cooperated with the JNA by ordering the 
territorial defence to hand in weapons to it.  Such confidence-building meas-
ures failed to appease Belgrade or the local Serb leadership but they caused 
deep anxiety among Bosnian Croats who had witnessed the massacre of their 
fellow Croats in Vukovar for instance at the same time. 
Of course in 1990-91 President Tudjman too had explored alternatives to 
the existing Yugoslav state-structure which fell short of full sovereign inde-
pendence for Croatia.  What is clear from the violence initiated by the JNA/
Serb forces in late June, 1991, through to the defeat of the Bosnian Serb forces 
by joint Croat-Bosnian forces and NATO air-strikes in late summer 1995 is 
that only a very deep conspiracy theorist could imagine a collaboration for 
common purpose between Tudjman and Milošević and their local support-
ers. 
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With the recognition of the un-historical and unreasonable nature of the 
conspiracy charge because of its dependence on retrospective allegations by 
subsequent political opponents of President Tudjman or those disappointed 
by his failure to extend patronage or promotion, the complex nature of the ori-
gins of the conflict between Croats and Bosnians in Central Bosnia becomes 
clearer.
I am not competent to discuss the details of specific events on the ground 
in and around Ahmici on or after 16th April, 1993, for instance, but my report 
puts in broader context the position of the international mediation, the coinci-
dence of the crisis over Srebrenica, and certain aspects of the media coverage 
of the massacre at Ahmici as facilitated by Britbat which raise questions and 
cast doubt on neat assumptions about the nature of the Muslim-Croat con-
flict.
The context of these events was one of disruption of the society by war and 
its consequent radicalisation.  Their status as victims of Serb aggression from 
the spring of 1992 did not mean that Muslim forces maintained the highest 
standards of respect for the human rights and property of others.  Sadly, in 
their radicalised and desperate position, Muslim forces and refugees took the 
line of least resistance in their embattled situation and regarded largely Croat 
areas of Central Bosnia as suitable places to gain compensation for their ter-
rible losses to the Serbs in eastern and northern Bosnia.
From the standpoint of an historian considering the available evidence 
on the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia and the eruption of the conflict 
between Croats and Bosnian Muslims in Central Bosnia in 1993, any inter-
pretation of a deep-seated Croatian master plan seems thoroughly misplaced. 
The background to the dreadful events suggest that the political leaders on 
both sides of the Croat-Muslim divide and at all levels found themselves in 
a conflict which neither had desired and which served the interests of their 
Serb enemies and helped to justify the policy of key Western states (especially 
Britain and France) who wished to avoid intervention or raising the arms 
embargo and had never wanted either an independent Croatia or an inde-
pendent Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
2. Historical Status of Bosnia-Herzegovina
With the outbreak of the Serbian war against Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 
spring of 1992, the embattled Muslim-led state enjoyed an enormous amount 
of international sympathy, at least among publics in Western states as well 
as in Muslim countries.  This extended well into the academic community. 
However desirable and laudable as a political and moral fact this sympathy 
may have been (it is something which I shared), it has created myths of its 
own to counter the propaganda onslaught which went along with the Serbian 
(para-)military attack. 
A benign myth was developed of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an historical entity 
of great antiquity, one of Europe’s very few continuous civic communities 
within easily recognisable boundaries recurrent over centuries.  A Bosnian 
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people — admittedly of mixed religious background  but united by civic iden-
tity — had allegedly  preserved their traditions into the present.  Although a 
civic and open society (in the best late twentieth century sense) this historical 
Bosnia was profoundly different and separate from its neighbours.
Unfortunately, Bosnia is not an island and never was.  Its frequently cited 
north-western border which seems to loom out of the mists of time like the 
White Cliffs of Dover in English history turns out to be more a mirage than 
a fixed geographical feature.  In so far as it has been fixed, it has been by alien 
powers de-marking their spheres of interest or administrative convenience 
rather than out of deference to Bosnian feelings and loyalties. 
The visual continuity of the western and northern borders of Bosnia after 
the Ottoman conquest is an optical illusion if it is taken to imply a continuity 
of a specific Bosnian statehood after 1463.  Many of the geo-strategic reasons 
which had led to the pre-Ottoman conquest borders between Croatia and 
Bosnia naturally applied after 1463.   But thereafter the relations between the 
societies on either side of the border were no longer between two Christian 
states sharing broadly similar political, social and religious structures, but 
between a continuing Croatia (as part of the Habsburg monarchy after 1526) 
and Bosnia as a province of the Ottoman Empire run on lines developed by 
the Turks over centuries elsewhere outside Bosnia certainly, and to a great 
extent outside the Balkans altogether.
The conversion of substantial parts of the population to Islam also marked 
a self-conscious break with Bosnia’s Christian past.  The new religious 
structure as well as its theology owed nothing to the pre-existing Christian 
churches.  It could not have happened without Ottoman conquest.  Whatever 
the validity of the unresolved controversies about how far Christian heresies 
— Bogomil or Patarene — had created a climate of disregard for Catholic or 
Orthodox Christian doctrines which facilitated conversion to Islam, without 
the Ottoman invasion and occupation the adoption of Islam could not have 
taken place.  Therefore 1463 marks a dramatic caesura in Bosnian history. 
That said, the formation of Ottoman Bosnia took almost 150 years. 
Bihać was outside Ottoman control until 1592, when Croatia lost it.  This 
region which was so defiantly Muslim despite its isolation during the war 
(1992-95) underwent in many ways a very similar process to the Krajina 
which enveloped it to the west and north.  Just as Serbs were settled on the 
Habsburg “Military Frontier” (Krajina) to provide Christian military colo-
nists who would act as a first-line of defence against an Ottoman invasion or 
plundering raids from the Sultan’s domains, so the Muslimification of Bihać 
represented a strategy by the Ottoman authorities to ensure their control over 
and the reliability of the north-westernmost tip of the Sultan’s empire. 
Although Ivo Banac has argued that “The continuity of Bosnian regional 
consciousness was also maintained by several factors that made Bosnian soci-
ety atypical of Ottoman possessions” — and he may be right to emphasise the 
relative autonomy of Muslim elites with their unusual hereditary fiefs and use 
of their own language “Bosnian” rather than Ottoman Turkish — nonethe-
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less, Professor Banac cites examples which undermine the modern myth of 
Bosnian continuity from the pre-1463 kingdom through the Ottoman upheav-
als to the present.  For instance, although, “unlike other conquered Balkan 
lands, Bosnia was not pulled asunder  into a cluster of arbitrary divisions”, it 
was “in fact expanded [my emphasis] to include old Croat heartlands on the 
Adriatic coast, its hinterland and parts of  Slavonia… the Sandžak of Novi 
Pazar, also belonged to [Ottoman] Bosnia, and its heavily Islamicised popula-
tion thought of itself as Bosnian.” Banac also notes that Ottoman “Bosnia … 
included such towns as Bihać, one of the sites of medieval Croat assemblies 
and never [emphasis added] part of medieval Bosnia.”1 
Banac argues that “The Ottoman way of dividing peoples by religious 
community is the key to Bosnian national mutations.  The Catholics main-
tained links with Croatia.  The… Orthodox community established ties with 
Serbia.”2 
In other words, Bosnian identity became a specifically Slav-speaking 
Muslim  phenomenon under Ottoman rule.  It included  Slav Muslims outside 
the traditional kingdom but incorporated by Ottoman imperial fiat into the 
Bosnian province, e.g,. the Sandžak. 
For Catholic Croats or Orthodox Serbs in the Ottoman period, Bosnia was 
a place of residence not a loyalty.  Wisdom encouraged obedience to the Sultan 
and his local representatives to avoid the harsh consequences of defiance, but 
it did not engender any willing identification with the system even at a local 
level. 
It is, however, true to say that Croatian Catholic attitudes towards Bosnian 
Muslims were less traumatised by the Ottoman conquest than Serbian ones. 
Perhaps because the Orthodox Serbs were almost entirely subject to Ottoman 
rule, their resentment at what was seen as the religious perfidy of former Slav 
Christians who had “turned Turk” was greater than among Croats, who had a 
hinterland under Habsburg control or in the independent republic of Ragusa 
(Dubrovnik) where their own co-religionists held sway. 
Like many Serbs most Croats seem to have regarded the Bosnian Muslims 
despite their conversion to Islam as  essentially still part of their nation.  Serbs 
and Croats of course disputed whose nation exactly it was that the Slav 
Muslims really belonged too — with the Croats taking a more positive view. 
The Muslims however belonged to their own broader community — that of 
the Faithful.  The Sultan was not simply their ruler he was also Caliph (spiritual 
head of the faithful).  Even though they mainly spoke their Slavic language, the 
Bosnian Muslims possessed the privileged status of all other Muslims in the 
Ottoman Empire and took on the obligations (haj, etc.) of followers of Islam. 
Of course, in local terms the Muslims of Bosnia (in today’s boundaries) 
had close relations with their co-religionists in the region who were naturally 
1 See Ivo BANAC, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Cornell UP: 
Ithaca, 1988 edition), 41.
2 Ibid., 41
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also under Ottoman rule until the roll-back of the Empire, especially after 
1804.  Most particularly the Muslim converts and their descendants of the 
Sandžak enjoyed intimate relations with Bosnian Muslims and indeed called 
themselves by the same name since after all they used the same language.  But 
Belgrade too with its 150 plus mosques (until after 1869) acted as one of the 
regional Islamic centres for the Bosnian Muslims.  
However, Serb hostility to the architecture of Islam as well to its adherents 
meant that the nineteenth century saw a diminution in links with Belgrade, 
Niš, etc., as Serbia’s growing independence coincided with destruction of 
mosques and (partial) ethnic cleansing of Muslims, especially from the north-
ern parts of the kingdom.
As the Ottoman Empire declined through the nineteenth century, Habsburg 
statesmen and policy-makers debated the pros and cons of annexing Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  Already in 1869 there was a serious debate in Vienna, but a key 
argument against annexation was the fear that it would strengthen the Croat 
factor in the Monarchy.  It was taken for granted that the inhabitants would 
share a fellow-feeling with the Croats who had a peculiar status after 1868 with 
their own governor in Zagreb and seats in the Budapest Parliament. 
It was only the threat of Serbian expansion into the region once the war of 
1876 broke out that decided Vienna and Budapest that the Dual Monarchy’s 
vital interests were served by pre-empting any transfer of control of Bosnia to 
the Serbs.3 
A large-scale though unquantifiable emigration of Muslims to resid-
ual Ottoman Turkey took place after Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the Sandžak of Novi Pazar in 1878.  What is significant for 
any understanding of the tradition of ethnic or communal identity is that the 
Turkish authorities lumped all Slavic Muslims from Serbia and Montenegro as 
well as the Austrian-occupied territory together under the name “Bosniaks”.  It 
has been estimated that up to 350,000 such Bosniaks live in modern Turkey.4 
The key figure, however, in the development of a specifically Bosnian 
identity after 1878 was the Hungarian official and expert on the South Slavs, 
Benjamin Kallay, who was Joint-Minister of Finance for the Dual Monarchy, 
1882-1903.  Kallay had warned against annexing Bosnia for fear of strength-
ening Croatian identity by both boosting the numbers of what were seen as 
Croats by up to a million and by creating a geographical space which made 
more strategic and economic sense than Croatia’s peculiar boomerang shape.5
Dr. Malcolm has argued that in the Ottoman period  that “many Bosnian 
Catholics  had looked to the lands beyond the Croatian and Dalmatian border 
for support even liberation.  But that was a matter of religion, not nation-
hood.”6  This is short of the truth since it was clearly a political matter.  If 
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Catholics looked for “liberation” to the west it was a political issue of identity. 
They preferred a common statehood with their fellow Catholics even under 
Habsburg rule.  As the nineteenth century went on Croats increasingly chal-
lenged the legitimacy of that rule and some argued for independence, others 
for independence in conjunction with the Serbs.
What failed to catch on despite Kallay’s subsidies and encouragement was a 
tripartite Croat-Serb-Muslim common Bosniak identity.  He could not isolate 
Bosnia-Herzegovina from its neighbours inside the Dual Monarchy and in 
Serbia and Montenegro.  Dr. Malcolm notes that “As Croat and Serb nation-
alism spread among the Catholic and Orthodox Bosnians  through the very 
networks of priests, schoolteachers and educated newspaper-readers which 
Austro-Hungarian policy had helped to bring into being, Kallay’s ‘Bošnjak’ 
project became more and more obviously doomed to failure.”7  After Austria-
Hungary’s formal annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, the Sandžak of 
Novi Pazar was separated and returned to Ottoman rule. 
The events at Sarajevo on 28th June, 1914, illustrated two points: one that a 
hardcore group of pro-Serb and in Gavrilo Princip’s mind “Yugoslav” activists 
were prepared to assassinate the Habsburg heir-apparent and that the great 
majority of the population (Muslim and Croat but also many Serbs) reacted 
negatively to the murder —- even though the Young Bosnia group had a smat-
tering of Croatian and Muslim members.8 
Allied military victory in the First World War decided the future shape 
of Yugoslavia.  Wartime discussions and alternatives emphasising non-Serb 
national rights, even a reformed Habsburg Monarchy containing all the South 
Slavs, were rendered irrelevant.  Serbia, led by the prince Regent Alexander I, 
saw itself as the victor and its forces often treated the “liberated” badly, espe-
cially the Muslims of Bosnia.9  
After the creation of the Kingdom of  the South Slavs (for convenience 
called Yugoslavia here), the majority of deputies elected to its parliament 
as supporters of the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation (JMO) chose to iden-
tify themselves as Croats (Royal Yugoslavia did not recognise “Muslim” as an 
identity).  In 1923, for instance, seventeen out of eighteen JMO deputies and 
their alternates declared themselves Croats (and the eighteenth deputy, Dr. 
Mehmed Spaho’s brother Fehim, who became reis ul-ulema or spiritual head 
of Yugoslavia’s Muslims (1938-42) identified himself as a Croat for census 
purposes.)10  Professor Donia emphasises an earlier set of figures immediately 
after the unification of the South Slavs before disillusionment among Yugoslav 
Muslims with Serbian domination set in very rapidly. 
7 Ibid., 149.
8 Ibid., 156-57.
9 For figures of alleged victims of Serbian and Montenegrin troops see N. MALCOLM, ibid., 
162-163. 
10 See I. BANAC, ibid., 375.
M. ALMOND, Expert Testimony                                                                                                    God. 36., br. 1., 177.-209. (2004) 
184 185
It is true to say that the six new administrative units into which Bosnia was 
divided in Yugoslavia corresponded to the six Kreise of the Austrian period. 
Dr. Malcolm comments in his book “Bosnia was the only constituent element 
of Yugoslavia which retained its identity in this way”, but even he has to admit 
that this continuity only went back to “final period of Ottoman rule.”11  In 
reality the reordering of the administrative boundaries in the new kingdom 
was based on what the royal government in Belgrade regarded as convenient 
and expedient. 
In 1929, Alexander I renamed the country “Yugoslavia” and reorganised its 
local administration.  Bosnia was divided among four of the nine new bano-
vine or administrative districts.  Rather melodramatically and misleadingly, 
Dr. Malcolm laments, “For the first time in more than four hundred years, 
Bosnia had been partitioned”!12 In fact, as we have seen parts of modern day 
Bosnia had not been added until 1592 while others like the Sandžak  had been 
removed as recently as 1909. 
In the aftermath of the assassination of Alexander I by Macedonian 
VMRO extremists working on behalf of the Croatian extreme nationalist 
Ustasha (with funds from Mussolini’s Italy)  in 1934, the administrative map 
of Yugoslavia was up for grabs especially as the Regent Paul’s government felt 
pressured to resolve internal dissent especially among the Croats in response 
to the external threat from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany who were increas-
ingly acting together in the region. 
The August,1939,  agreement — the Sporazum — between the leading 
Croat politician, Vladko Ma…ek and the Serbian Prime Minister, Dragiša 
Cvetković which effectively conceded a large share  of Bosnia (as today rec-
ognised) to a new Croatian unit within a reformed Yugoslavia has a special 
significance because the boundaries delineated then played such a role in the 
thinking behind the Vance-Owen Plan and the debates about it in the spring 
of 1993.  
Like the Regent Prince Paul, Ma…ek was anti-Nazi as he was anti-Ustasha. 
He was the Sporazum as a way of guaranteeing Croat rights after 20 years of 
Serb domination but without falling into the Fascist trap of the Ustasha.  Of 
course the international situation worsened considerably immediately after 
the Sporazum was signed.  Nazi Germany’s military victories — and ironically 
Hitler’s need to come to the assistance of Italy in Greece — put huge pressure 
on Yugoslavia to agree to collaborate with the Reich.  In April, 1941, Prince 
Paul agreed that Yugoslavia would join the Tripartite or Anti-Comintern Pact 
but only after the Nazis conceded that their troops would not enter Yugoslavia 
and would therefore respect its sovereignty.
Instead of accepting this remarkable concession by Hitler, some Serbian 
nationalist hotheads in the Yugoslav Army egged on by British Intelligence 
staged the coup which provoked the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia and the king-
11 See N. MALCOLM, ibid., 165.
12 Ibid., 169.
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dom’s collapse.  Without the Nazi invasion and conquest, the emergence of the 
Ustasha as Croatia’s ruling elite would have been inconceivable.13
The fact that the so-called Independent State of Croatia (NDH) depended 
on Nazi and Italian Fascist patronage and that it committed atrocities against 
scores of thousands of Serbs in particular has shaped foreign perceptions 
of Croatia down to the present-day despite the fact that many more Croats 
including the young Franjo Tudjman fought in the Partisans against the col-
laborators.  This is particularly significant when we remember that service in 
the partisans was voluntary and of course very risky whereas the NDH used 
its prerogatives as a state to conscript soldiers.  
Despite its savagery towards Serbs and political opponents, Ante Pavelić’s 
regime courted the Muslims.  Already on 25th April, 1941, he told Fehim Spaho 
that he wanted the Bosnian Muslims (now incorporated within the NDH) to 
feel “free, contented and possessed of equal rights.” Eleven former JMO politi-
cians were invited to join the new Zagreb pseudo-parliament.14  Like other 
clergy in the Ustashe state,  Muslim clerics were horrified by the brutality and 
lawlessness of the new regime towards Serbs and Jews — though their protests 
carried no more weight than those from the Catholic hierarchy.  In any case 
the main threat to Muslim well-being came from the Serbian Chetniks.  Even 
relatively moderate Chetnik leaders who thought in terms of Yugoslav unity 
versus the German and Italian occupiers thought “there can be no true unity 
with them [the Muslims].”15  
Under cover of settling scores with the collaborators with the Axis occupi-
ers, Tito’s Partisans were able to pursue a purge of  all potential political oppo-
nents too.16  The combination of Communist persecution and flight into exile 
in the period 1945-48 stabilised the domestic situation. (After Stalin’s break 
with him in June, 1948, Tito also annihilated disloyal Communists.)17 
3. Perceptions Of Croatian Nationalism
Today after the NATO intervention against Yugoslavia over Kosovo in 
1999, and the concomitant propaganda campaign in much of the Western 
media to demonise the Serbs as the “Enemy”, it is hard to recall how different 
the media picture of Balkan heroes and villains was before 1991 and immedi-
ately after the outbreak of the post-Yugoslav wars.  However, any analysis of 
how the international community and its agents reacted to the implosion of 
old Yugoslavia must take into account the stereotypes in Western minds about 
13 For a reliable summary of these events, see Christopher BENNETT, Yugoslavia’s Bloody 
Collapse, 39-42.
14 See N. MALCOLM, ibid., 185.
15 Ibid., 187.
16 See Ljubo SIRC, Between Hitler and Tito: Nazi Occupation and Communist Oppression 
(London, 1989).
17 See I. BANAC, With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, 
Cornell UP: Ithaca, 1989.
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how to classify the Balkan peoples on standard criteria of political correct-
ness.18 
Like the other Balkan peoples it was only in the nineteenth century that the 
Croats as a nation began to impinge on West European, and certainly British 
consciousness.  Whereas the Serbs like the Byronic Greeks entered the British 
public mind as heroic freedom fighters struggling for their liberty against the 
slip-shod and brutal Turk,  the Croats only really came to cognisance as the 
loyal, not to say subservient subjects of the reactionary Habsburgs.  The nega-
tive reputation of the Croats as a race was fixed from their first entry into the 
British public mind in 1848 when Croatian troops (by no means all ethnic 
Croats) led by the kingdom’s Ban, Jellaćić, seemed to play the role of servile 
foot-soldiers on the reactionary side in the struggle against the romantic lib-
eral revolutionary nationalist in Hungary who had rebelled against the mon-
archy, but who had done so, at least in part, as a way of ensuring their right to 
tyrannise and even expel their Slav and Romanian subjects. 
It was not just liberals who denounced the Croats in 1848 and after. 
Arguably the two most influential  European intellectuals for the coming cen-
tury and more, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels launched polemics of unprec-
edented ferocity and racial abuse against the Croats: “An Austria shaken to 
its very foundations was kept in being and secured by the enthusiasm of the 
Slavs for the black and yellow; … it was precisely the Croats…” According 
to Marx’s Neue Rheinische Zeitung, Croats were  “That horde of miscreants, 
rogues, and vagabonds… riff-raff, abject peasant hirelings, vomit…” Engels 
himself decreed a “war of annihilation and ruthless terrorism” against “this 
national refuse.”  Even in the 1880s, Engels was still “without mercy” towards 
the Herzegovinans.19  
At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 Lloyd George was happy to see 
a new state Yugoslavia come into existence on the ruins of the Habsburg 
Empire, but he did not oppose Italian ambitions to annex parts of Istria and 
Dalmatia because “It was the Croats who had been used by the Habsburgs [in 
1848] to crush and keep down Italian liberty, to hunt, imprison and execute 
Italian patriots” Lloyd George even quoted A.H. Clough’s poetry:20
  “I see the Croat soldier stands, 
Upon the grass of your redoubts; 
The eagle with his black wings flouts
 The breath and beauty of your land.”
18 By “political correctness” I do not necessarily mean that criteria applied by the more 
advanced US universities, but the standard -- usually unspoken -- assumptions of value-laden 
assessment of foreigners/outsiders by the classic insiders politicians, diplomats, generals, the 
higher realms of journalists and the lower reaches of psyops.
19 See M. ALMOND, Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, Heinemann: London, 
1994, 70-71, and references to Marxist exterminism directed at the Croats and other “reaction-
ary peoples”.
20 Quoted in M. ALMOND, ibid. 72-73.
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The Second World War reinvigorated the anti-Croat sentiment in Britain. 
The grotesque nature of the Pavelić regime confirmed long-held stere-
otypes.  The presence of Conservative politicians like Sir Fitzroy Maclean and 
Randolph Churchill, plus William Deakin one of Churchill’s pre-war research 
assistants among Tito’s Partisans acted as an endorsement of the restoration of 
Yugoslav unity against Quisling separatists even under a Communist.  Stalin’s 
falling out with Tito in 1948 simply reopened the Tory-Tito love-affair.  In 
1991, when Lord Carrington was appointed EC peace mediator, his first act 
was to ask Sir Fitzroy Maclean to brief him over breakfast at White’s!
Britain’s elder statesmen regularly endorsed seeing the post-1991 conflict 
as a re-run of the Second World War and Germany therefore as the big enemy 
pulling the strings behind its Balkan quisling.  Sir Fitzroy Maclean was by no 
means alone in doing so, but his wartime exploits in Yugoslavia gave him unri-
valled prestige and influence — not least among Army personnel.  He assured 
viewers of the BBC’s premier news programme Newsnight in December, 1991, 
that the Serbs had been “understandably… very conscious  of the German 
danger” and he accepted the interviewer’s description of re-united Germany 
as the “Fourth Reich.”21 
The assumption that 1990s Croatian nationalists were just lineal successors 
of the Ustasha collaborators and therefore as morally repulsive was common-
place in the British political and media establishment.  For instance, when I 
interviewed Douglas Hurd, the Foreign Secretary, in late February, 1994, it 
became clear that he had no idea that Tudjman had been a Partisan during the 
Second World War and not a collaborator — a fact  which one of his officials 
confirmed for him!  
In the immediate aftermath of news of the Croat-Muslim conflict in 
Central Bosnia, in  April, 1993, a senior figure in the British establishment 
Lord Healey, the former Labour Defence Secretary and Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, was widely interviewed.  His interpretation of the geopolitical 
significance of the current conflict drew heavily on the argument of Ustasha-
HDZ continuity. 
Germany was now backing Croatia according to Healey “because Germany 
had been Croatia’s ally during the Second World War…during that period 
Croats killed up to a million Serbs.” Turning to current events, Healey insisted, 
“Don’t forget that the Croat forces who are killing Muslims and Serbs… are 
wearing swastikas on their helmets, some of them are wearing SS uniforms 
and they give the Nazi salute”! No evidence was cited nor any asked for: 
Healey was simply taking to its logical fantastic conclusion the stereotyping of 
Croats in the establishment media.22  
21 Quoted in M. ALMOND, ibid., 369, note 49.
22 For Lord Healey’s comments on BBC 2’s Newsnight (28th April, 1993), see M. ALMOND, 
ibid., 321. It is worth recalling that Lord Healey had explicitly supported Tito’s repressive 
measures after the war in a speech to the 1945 Labour Party Conference:  “If the labour move-
ment finds it necessary to introduce a greater degree of police supervision and more immedi-
ate and drastic punishment for their opponents than we in this country would be prepared to 
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At the height of the siege of Vukovar, Britain’s Channel Four News chose 
to broadcast the documentary Ratlines which perpetuated the stereotype of 
Croats as clerico-fascist collaborators with the Nazis in genocide.  Presumably 
many of the British officers and men who went to Bosnia-Hercegvina in the 
coming months as part of UNPROFOR were conditioned in their expecta-
tions and attitudes by this sort of material.23 
Anti-Croat racialism could masquerade under the banner of politically 
correct anti-racism.  For instance, the Guardian’s columnist Edward Pearce, 
“Indeed so much has the slashing of neck arteries been the historic way of 
the Croats that one wonders if our version of the native name should not be 
pronounced with a dipthong to rhyme with throat.”24 
France had seen Serbia as an ally since 1914.  Anyone familiar with the geog-
raphy of its major cities — Paris, Lyons, or even Cannes — will have noticed 
streets and bridges named in honour of Serbia or its leaders.  In November, 
1991, President François Mitterrand announced, “Croatia belonged to the 
Nazi bloc, not Serbia.”25 
Against this media disseminated establishment picture of Croat neo-Nazis 
as the true villains of the Yugoslav implosion, British troops sent to Bosnia-
Herzegovina were under still more potent influences to prepare their mental 
picture of the conflict in an anti-Croat way. 
It is naïve at best and misleading at worst to talk as though the personnel 
of international agencies active in the former Yugoslavia were necessarily 
wholly devoted to their UN-mandate duties without any reference to their 
home governments.  Quite clearly the national contingents in UNPROFOR, 
especially the British and French forces,  as a matter of course accepted direc-
tives from their home governments and consulted them regularly.  In addition 
to the intelligence officers deployed with these forces, there were of course a 
large number of undercover intelligence agents in the region, which is entirely 
normal and understandable given the sensitivity of the conflict-zone, but their 
presence as actors in and witnesses of events under false identity necessarily 
distorts the reliability of evidence. 
It should be remembered that John Zametica in person and as an author 
was frequently relied upon to brief British personnel, both military and civil-
ian, about to be deployed to ex-Yugoslavia.  His 1992 Adelphi report for the 
International Institute of Strategic Studies continued to be disseminated 
among British officers even after his departure from Britain to take up the 
tolerate, we must be prepared to understand their point of view.”  Quoted in ibid.,  404, note 
64.
23 Broadcast in  November, 1991.  The book of the same name by Mark AARONS and John 
LOFTUS, Ratlines: How the Vatican’s Nazi Networks Betrayed Western Intelligence to the Soviets, 
Mandarin: London, 1991, presents a more complex picture.
24 See The Guardian 31st August, 1993
25 Quoted in M. ALMOND, ibid., xii.
M. ALMOND, Expert Testimony                                                                                                    God. 36., br. 1., 177.-209. (2004) 
190 191
post of deputy-foreign minister in Dr. Karadžić’s Pale regime.  The use of 
Zametica’s short account of the origins and meaning of the post-Yugoslav 
conflict in these circumstances explains the deep anti-Muslim and anti-Croat 
bias permeating the British officer corps before deployment.26
Throughout this period, ministers in John Major’s government repeat-
edly (in public and private) made their antagonism towards Croatia known. 
Tory Ministers briefed the British press regularly that Croatia was a puppet 
of Germany and its independence only recognised under pressure from 
Chancellor Kohl.  Ministers in the Ministry of Defence like Lord Cranbourne 
and Sir Nicholas Bonsor were particularly hostile to Croatian independence, 
but also to Bosnia-Herzegovina.  They took a much softer line on Republika 
Srpska.  A prominent pro-Serb Conservative MP Henry Bellingham was made 
Parliamentary Private Secretary to Malcolm Rifkind when he became Foreign 
Secretary in 1995, despite his long-standing association with John Kennedy 
(Gvozdenović).  Another Conservative MP Harold Elletson was co-director of 
a public relations company with Mr. Kennedy (who was also Prince Michael 
of Kent’s private secretary).  Mr. Elletson acted as an MI6 informer with the 
approval of the Prime Minister John Major despite his election to the House 
of Commons.  Mr. Elletson’s public utterances of support for the Bosnian 
Serbs could only be taken at face value.  Since then it has been claimed in  the 
British  press that he was pursuing an MI6 line as an informant on his contacts 
in Pale in the hope of obtaining valuable information for the British intel-
ligence service.27  Servicemen and public alike would only have known about 
his publicly expressed pro-Serb point of view. 
Few politically alert and ambitious British officers in UNPROFOR hoping 
for promotion would have been encouraged to challenge the ministerial bias. 
Nor did things change with the general election defeat of the Conservatives 
in May, 1997.  Harold Elletson’s frequent travelling companion to Republika 
Srpska, Dr. John Reid, became Armed Forces Minister in the incoming Labour 
government.  Dr. Reid had been an eloquent critic of the Bosnian Muslims 
and Croats.  Like the Labour Shadow Defence Secretary, David Clark, Dr. Reid 
was censured by the House of Commons Standards Committee watchdog for 
allowing Dr. Karadžić to pay his hotel bills during a trip to meet the Bosnian 
Serb leader in Geneva in 1993 — the year is significant.  On that visit, as on 
others, to Republika Srpska Dr. Reid and Mr. Clark were accompanied by the 
Conservative general election candidate John Kennedy (née Gvozdenović) 
who acted as the Bosnian Serb leader’s public spokesman in London.  Harold 
Elletson, another of Mr. Kennedy’s partners, acted as parliamentary “pair” for 
26 See John ZAMETICA, The Yugoslav Conflict, Adelphi Paper 270, IISS: London, 1992. I 
gained an insight into the assumptions put in British officers’ minds when — at the invitation of 
Sir Michael Rose following a social encounter in Oxford — I lectured on the Yugoslav crisis at 
Staff College, Camberley on 5th April, 1993. My invitation was clearly a misunderstanding in that 
hostility to both Bosnian Muslims and Croats was taken for granted in the small-talk as well as 
the post-lecture questions.
27 For these allegations before his defeat in the 1997 General Election, see “Pro-Serb Tory MP 
was MI6 Agent” and “Honourable member’s life as a spy” in The Observer,  22 December, 1996.
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Dr. Reid and they often travelled together. (I met them in Tbilisi, Georgia, in 
October, 1992, when they gave me the benefit of their vehemently pro-Serb 
and anti-Croat views.)28  
Such is the power of the negative image of the Croats as a tainted reaction-
ary nation that even academic studies of how Westerners have created an 
“Orientalist” picture of the Balkans, stereotyping its peoples as cruel, untrust-
worthy, bigoted, etc.,  drop their strictures when it comes to Croatia.  The 
author of one of the best-received critiques of Western prejudices about the 
Balkan peoples, Maria Todorova, for instance, suddenly adopts the posture 
when she criticises the New York Times because it “had the nerve to run an 
editorial” in March, 1995, suggesting “Washington’s best hope is to appeal to 
predominantly Roman Catholic Croatia’s longstanding desire to extricate itself 
from Balkan conflicts and associate itself more closely to the West as if [com-
ments Professor Todorova] it was not precisely in the name of this Roman 
Catholic Croatia that some of the most gruesome crimes in the Balkans were 
committed during World War II…”29
Titoite propaganda abroad had naturally sought to discredit all opponents 
of the Communist regime after 1945 as Fascists, as had other Communist 
regimes.  Tito’s regime was unique in achieving respectability across the politi-
cal spectrum in a country like Britain.  This fact, combined with its logical 
alternative the negative picture of the Croats in particular as archetypes of 
collaboration and war criminality,  had profound consequences after 1991.
4. The Break-Up Of Titoite Yugoslavia
Professor Donia is right to lay the lion’s share of the blame for Yugoslavia’s 
descent into violence on Slobodan Milošević and Belgrade, but to understand 
how and why Bosnian Muslim-Croat relations soured requires shifting atten-
tion away from the Serbs’ misdeeds (fundamental though they were) to the 
reaction by Muslim and Croat leaders to what was happening in Yugoslavia 
after 1987 (the beginning of Milošević’s ascendancy in Serbia). 
The unravelling of post-Tito Yugoslavia was not primarily the work of 
political outsiders like Tudjman and  Izetbegović.  They only took centre stage 
in Croatian and Bosnian politics after the decay was far advanced.  Other 
members of the Communist elite misread and mishandled the crisis created 
by Milošević’s appeal to Serbian nationalism over Kosovo.  It was the failure 
of the Yugoslav Communist leaders— also over economic issues — which 
hastened the breakdown of the one-party system and allowed dissidents to 
emerge on the political stage, but only when the crisis resulting from Serbia’s 
actions in Kosovo and Vojvodina was far advanced.  As Professor Banac noted 
in 1993: 
28 For the Tory pro-Belgrade lobby’s fate at the general election in 1997, see Tom CARTER, 
“Belgrade’s UK Lobby Decimated” in Bosnia Report 19, June-August, 1997.
29 See Maria TODOROVA, Imagining the Balkans, OUP: Oxford, 1997, 158.  Perhaps signifi-
cantly, Todorova’s only two references to Karl Marx ignore his tirades against the Croats and other 
“reactionary peoples” as if they are not part of the imagination-problem under discussion. 
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 “In fact, everybody was appeasing Milošević.  They were prepared to 
grant him all the leeway to reintegrate Kosovo and Vojvodina into 
Serbia — and this was done by some of the best people on the Yugoslav 
political scene!  Some of the worst things in Kosovo were done while 
Janez Drnovšek was the chairman of the collective presidency and Ante 
Marković, the premier of Yugoslavia…  And while this was happening, 
the so-called Croat nationalists of the Tudjman type were not permit-
ted to participate in any political dialogue.  They emerged precisely 
because the Croat society felt  tremendously threatened by Milošević, 
and the issue in the 1990 election was precisely what to do in order to 
escape from the deathly grip of Milošević’s policy.  Tudjman, initially 
tried to resolve these dilemmas by bringing about the confederal pro-
posal.  One can argue whether independence was his principal aim all 
along, but one should not underestimate how popular that demand 
was in Croatian society…  I think it is quite unfair to equate the phe-
nomenon of Milošević with the sort of defensive mechanisms that 
developed in Slovenia and Croatia to try to withstand it.”30
There is no need here to go into detail over the events in Slovenia and 
Croatia in 1991.  What is important is the reaction inside Bosnia-Herzegovina 
to the actions of the JNA and Serbian para-militaries against Croatia in par-
ticular.  To understand the tensions between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-
Herzegovina after that republic’s independence in 1992, the reaction of the 
SDA leaders to the war in Croatia needs to be recalled. 
Even the historian,  Christopher Bennett, who takes a very jaundiced view 
of President Tudjman and Croatian policy, offers a differentiated view of the 
causes of Muslim-Croat tension  despite his speculation that Tudjman put 
the strategic and  economic interests of Croatia “a poor second to nationalist 
dreams and the annexation of a chunk of Bosnia-Herzegovina formed a fun-
damental part of what he increasingly considered his historic mission of unit-
ing all Croats within a single Croatian state.” Giving an excellent summary of 
the causes of the  problems between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, Bennett 
argues that:
 “The informal Croat-Muslim alliance was hampered from the outset 
by Croat resentment at the way the Bosnian government had refused 
to acknowledge the Serbian aggression in Croatia and turned a blind 
eye to JNA operations against Croats in western Herzegovina during 
the war in Croatia.  Since Sarajevo had made no preparations for war, 
it was not in a position to offer assistance to the rest of the country 
and effectively abandoned Croat-populate areas.  To survive the initial 
Serb onslaught, Croats from Herzegovina had had to organise their 
own defence and to look to Croatia for supplies and Croat emigres 
30 See “Separating History from Myth: An Interview with Ivo Banac” in Ali Rabia and 
Lawrence Lifschultz, editors, Why Bosnia? Writings on the Balkan War, Pamphleteers’ Press: 
Stony Creek, Connecticut, 1993, 160.
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for financial support.  As a result, it was the HVO and HOS, not the 
Bosnian Army, which halted the Serb advance across Herzegovina and 
then began liberating territory seized in the first month of fighting. 
However,  having incurred heavy casualties, Croat forces were unwill-
ing to turn their gains over to the Sarajevo government and resented 
the way Izetbegović avoided placing the alliance on a formal foot-
ing, yet expected them to take in Muslim refugees from elsewhere in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina. [Emphasis added]”31 
For Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it seemed obvious that the JNA/Serb 
para-militaries would turn to aggressive action there.  Faced by such an 
impending tragedy the Muslim/SDA leaders of the newly-elected democratic 
government in Sarajevo preferred to bury their heads in the sand or to try to 
appease the Serb leaders by cooperating with the JNA.
Of course, the SDA leadership was not alone in trying to avoid facing up 
to the impending Serb onslaught in Bosnia.  The EC mediation and UN both 
refused to countenance a preventative deployment of peacekeepers in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  To make matters worse, the UN decreed that the headquarters 
of the force dispatched to enforce the ceasefire in Croatia would be based in 
Sarajevo and Banja Luka surrounded by JNA forces.  General Lewis Mackenzie 
comments in his memoirs: “Forcing us to put our major logistics base in Banja 
Luka - … absolutely crammed with JNA units - was a dumb idea.”32 
At an academic conference held in St. Antony’s College, Oxford, in 
November, 1991, it was striking that even experts like Christopher Cviić 
and Dr. James Gow did not take a Bosnian declaration of independence for 
granted, nor an extension of the war there.  That uncertainty left the Croats in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in a very awkward position.  Not to make preparations 
for their own defence when Sarajevo was reluctant to “provoke” the JNA and 
its local Serb allies could easily have left the Croats defenceless before the kind 
of onslaught which had in the previous six months seen the massacre and 
forced flight of so many Croats in Croatia itself.  The siege of Vukovar and the 
bombardment of Dubrovnik were happening at this time. 
The ambiguous public stand of President Izetbegović in the autumn of 
1991 invited criticism even from sympathisers with his position.  Despite 
his enthusiasm for Bosnia and its President Noel Malcolm admitted that 
“Extraordinarily, President Izetbegović had even allowed the [Yugoslav] 
army to confiscate the weapons supplies of the local territorial defence units: 
it seems he was trying thereby to assure the army commanders of his own 
peaceful intentions…”33
To make Muslim-Croat relations worse, as Dr. Malcolm noted, as Sarajevo 
began to organise a BiH Army, “Izetbegović offended them [the Croats] by 
31 See C. BENNETT, ibid., 200.
32 See Lewis MACKENZIE, Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo, Douglas & McIntyre: 
Vancouver, B.C., 1993, 107.
33 N. MALCOLM, ibid., 230.
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appointing to his senior command one of the few Muslims who had risen to the 
rank of General in the Yugoslav federal army [JNA]  - Šefer Halilović, who had 
commanded federal army units attacking Croatia during the previous war.”34 
5. Karadjordjevo
On 25th March, 1991, the Serbian and Croatian Presidents met at the old 
royal hunting lodge at Karadjordjevo.  This meeting has attained mythical sta-
tus in the conspiracy theory literature which equates Tudjman and Milošević 
as partners in crime in the demonology of the Balkan conflict.  Robert Donia 
states in his expert report:  ‘Karadjordjevo’ entered the political lexicon as a 
synonym for the division of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia.”35 
Whatever was discussed it is clear that nothing of substance was agreed. 
This was not for Tudjman’s lack of willingness to make concessions to Serbia 
to avoid an armed conflict.  The situation by late March, 1991, was that 
President Milošević had faced down the protests against his regime which had 
climaxed on 9th March, and on 16th March, the Serb National Council in Knin 
announced the Krajina’s secession from Croatia which had been simmering 
since August, 1990.  President Tudjman felt Croatia was under great pressure 
to calm the Serbs both inside the Republic and in Belgrade.  It is said that he 
offered territorial concessions in eastern Croatia to Serbia itself and autono-
my to the Krajina in return for a limited partition of Bosnia which would have 
given Croatia much less than the Banovina of 1939.  Milošević, however, did 
not accept any compromises and the clock ticked on to the explosive break-
down of Yugoslavia from late June, 1991.36 
Conspiracies may be thwarted, but in the case of the alleged collusion 
between Tudjman and Milošević nothing happened to prevent them carrying 
out their partition if that had really been their plan.  Neither the UN  nor the 
West (NATO and/or the EC) were prepared to intervene in Yugoslavia in the 
spring of  1991.  It is easily forgotten today that the Soviet Union still existed 
and that it was President Bush’s policy to promote its continued existence. 
US policy towards Yugoslavia was predicated on its role as an example to the 
Soviet Union.  Specifically, refusing to encourage secession by Slovenia or 
Croatia was intended to send a message to the Baltic States.37  
Like all good conspiracy theories, the prosecution argument that the 
Serbian and Croatian leaderships conspired to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina 
at the expense of its Muslim citizens has the backing of circumstantial evi-
34 Ibid., 241.
35 See page 136 in this volume.
36 For a summary of the situation in spring, 1991, see C. BENNETT, ibid., 147, who comes 
to the conclusion that “Had the issue in Yugoslavia in 1991 been the condition of the Serbs 
in Croatia, Tudjman certainly gave Milošević the opportunity to resolve it at Karadjordjevo… 
Milošević had no desire to end the conflict with Croatia.” 
37 See the explicit references to Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the same context by State 
Department officials quoted in my Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, 44-45.
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dence, but as Sherlock Holmes would no doubt have pointed out, this par-
ticular dog did not bark.  Whatever Tudjman and Milošević were supposed 
to have agreed nothing came of it.  Similarly when Mate Boban met and Dr. 
Radovan Karadžić in Graz on 6th May, 1992, the conspiracy theorists had them 
carving up Bosnia-Herzegovina between them.  It may be significant that this 
meeting was apparently facilitated by the Cutilheiro meeting in Lisbon and so 
perhaps a partition would have suited the international community as a reso-
lution to its Bosnian dilemmas.  But again nothing came of the talks.38 
Writing about developments after the end of March, 1992, one of President 
Tudjman’s most influential critics in the international media, Christopher 
Cviić, offers a clear picture of the development of the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina before concluding  (in my view in an illogical way) that the root 
of the problems in 1993 lay at Karadjordjevo:
“Fighting soon spread to other parts of Bosnia….  The Croats in the south 
as well as those in the north in the region of the Sava River, the historic bor-
der between Croatia and Bosnia, fought back successfully in alliance with 
some Moslems.  But the majority of Moslems, too long encouraged by their 
leader, President Alija Izetbegović to believe that the JNA and Belgrade could 
be bought off provided that the Moslems did not rock the boat, were still too 
stunned and disorientated to fight back.  The Croat-Moslem alliance did not 
last long, however.  It was undermined by President Tudjman, whose oppor-
tunistic but naïve approach to developments allowed Milošević to trick him 
into discussing Bosnia’s dismemberment by Croatia and Serbia, a fatal move 
which sowed mistrust and eventually helped to lead to bitter armed conflict 
between Bosnia’s Croats and Moslems.”39 
Cviić’s account actually suggests that the Croats had had good reason to 
fear a sell-out by the Muslims though  of course in reality the Serbs would not 
offer Sarajevo remotely acceptable terms but few Croats could be sure of that:
Even a  sharp critic of Tudjman like Dr. Noel Malcolm does not argue that 
the Croatian President was simply the Janus-face of  his Serbian counterpart. 
Although Dr. Malcolm has argued that “some degree of symmetry had been 
observable for a long time between the Serbian and Croatian positions on 
Bosnia: in March, 1991 Presidents Milošević and Tudjman met to discuss 
possible ways of dividing Yugoslavia, and the division of Bosnia had been on 
their agenda.”  He concluded, “But the symmetry was only partial:  Serbia had 
gone much further, much earlier, and whereas the Bosnian Serbs had set up 
‘Autonomous Regions’ in May 1991 and a ‘parliament’ in October, 1991 (final-
ly declaring a ‘Serb Republic’ on 27 March 1992), the Croat counterpart, the 
‘Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna’, was not proclaimed until July, 1992, 
after three months of Serbian military offensive in Bosnia.” Malcolm contin-
ues “The Croats of Hercegovina had some reason to be more hard-line, having 
38 See Danas (Zagreb),4th July, 1994.
39 Christopher CVIIĆ, An Awful Warning: the War in Ex-Yugoslavia, Centre for Policy Studies, 
33.
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witnessed the military build-up and establishment of the ‘Serb Autonomous 
Region’ there… The general pattern of events, both military and political, was 
that the Croats were responding to Serb initiatives, and, to some extent, imi-
tating them.”40 
Furthermore, even Dr. Malcolm (whom I regard as the best informed and 
most eloquent of the proponents of  Bosnian statehood) admits that “After 
they (“Orthodox and Catholic Bosnians” to use Dr. Malcolm’s term) had been 
joined in the same country with Serbia and Croatia for seventy-four years, it 
was natural that many of the members of these communities in Bosnia would 
identify with those two ethnic fatherlands.” [Emphasis added]. Dr. Malcolm’s 
counter-argument is pragmatic rather than based on the natural or normal 
status of Bosnia as a state-always-in-waiting for rebirth: “But once Yugoslavia 
had ceased to exist, the very same fact which made the preservation of Bosnia 
difficult — its nationally mixed population — also made it imperative.”41 
The problem, sadly, was that Serb leaders and paramilitaries were not 
prepared to accept this.  More pertinently to this case, the dithering of 
Izetbegović’s government created insecurity in Croat minds about how reli-
able the Muslims would be.  Croats in Croatia had already been the victims of 
ethnic cleansing while the Bosniac Muslims looked away.  It was not unrea-
sonable to fear that Sarajevo might yet cut a deal with the Serbs to avoid con-
flict, but at the cost of the Croats.
No doubt during the conflict there were occasions when Serb forces coop-
erated with Croats against Muslims, but on occasion the Serbs found Muslim 
allies — including against Muslims as when Fikret Abdić broke with Sarajevo 
and its representatives in Bihać.  But these temporary and conditional alli-
ances of convenience cannot disguise the fact that at crucial moments Croatia 
and the Bosnian Croats saved the Muslim-led side.  This was not only obvi-
ously the case after the fall of Srebrenica in July, 1995, when there were good 
grounds for believing that UNPROFOR was actively conniving at a ruthless 
simplification of the map by facilitating the Serb conquest of Muslim enclaves, 
including Bihać as well as Gorazde. (Žepa had already fallen.) Naturally the 
fall of Bihać to General Mladić’s troops would have had tremendous impli-
cations for the security of the Croatian territory beyond it and the Krajina. 
Without Croatian intervention, before NATO bombs fell, Bosnia might have 
been overrun.
Yet even at the height of the Croat-Muslim conflict in 1993 as President 
Izetbegović told me and a group of other visitors in November, 1996,  when 
pressed to condemn Tudjman in the same terms as Milošević as an architect 
of Bosnia’s destruction, the Bosnian President refused to do so saying that 
when Tudjman had the opportunity to strangle Bosnia in 1993 he had not 
done so despite all their mutual differences over Herceg-Bosna.
40 N. MALCOLM, ibid., 232.
41 Ibid., 235.
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6. Unity Of Bosnia-Herzegovina Doubted
It was not just Serb or Croat nationalists who challenged the right or wis-
dom of the existence of an independent and unified Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Almost all respectable international opinion, including especially the inter-
national peace mediators, doubted the viability and legitimacy of an integral 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
There was no reason to think the international community would come to 
Bosnia’s aid and given the rhetoric of President Mitterrand, for instance, there 
was good reason to fear that the international community might even sympa-
thise with a Serbian onslaught.  As we have seen in November, 1991, despite 
his own role as a high Vichy official Mitterrand had taken sides on the basis of 
the wartime role of Croats and Serbs between 1941-45.  As late as September, 
1994, President Mitterrand was still asking “Why should a country’s internal 
administrative borders automatically become frontiers under international 
law?”42
Writing about the autumn of 1991, US ambassador Warren Zimmermann 
recalled “[Izetbegović] asked for, and got European Community monitors in 
Bosnia.  He asked for,  but didn’t get, UN peacekeepers there.  Cyrus Vance… 
took the traditional, if puzzling, line with me that peacekeepers are used after 
a conflict, not before.  Neither the US government nor the UN supported 
Izetbegović’s request for peacekeepers.  In a cable to Washington I urged this 
innovative step but didn’t press for it as hard as I should have.”43 [emphasis 
added] 
These appeals went on into the winter, 1991-92.  Since the EC’s sponsored 
Peace Conference for former Yugoslavia, chaired by Lord Carrington refused 
to listen to the entreaties from President Izetbegović that it devote attention 
to forestalling a conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the JNA and local Serb 
nationalist forces, it is hardly surprising that local Croats were far from confi-
dent about the survivability of Bosnia-Herzegovina even within a continuing 
Yugoslavia.  This is the context in which the quotations from  Perica Jurić at 
the HDZ meeting in Zagreb on 27th December, 1991 should be understood: 
“I)  I think that we can do everything regarding integration, from serious 
defense preparations to institutional links, to ties in the most serious sense of 
the word.  At the diplomatic level, our people in Sarajevo can continue swear-
ing that they are in favour of a sovereign Bosnia and  Herzegovina as we have 
done so far. 
II)  I think that this sovereignty will not happen, nobody is taking it seri-
ously anymore.”44  
It must be remembered that all these discussions took place against the 
backdrop of the armed intervention by the JNA in Croatia since late June, 
1991.  Croats, on either side of the republican boundary between Croatia and 
42 See Le Figaro, 10th September, 1994.
43 Warren ZIMMERMANN, Origins of a Catastrophe, 172.
44 Z2373.1, page 54.
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Bosnia-Herzegovina, naturally felt solidarity but they were also aware that the 
JNA and Serb para-military forces regarded Croats as a bloc too.  In the after-
math of the destruction of Vukovar and the bombardment of coastal cities in 
Dalmatia, it was not certain that the JNA and Serb forces would not turn on 
Croats inside Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Nor was the de facto lasting cease-fire in 
the Serb-Croatian conflict predictable in late 1991. 
In fact in late October, 1991, Izetbegović told Zimmermann, “Independence 
is not our goal, though it’s an option.”45  Of course, by this time both Slovenia 
and Croatia had declared their own independence and both Ljublijana and 
Zagreb had made it clear to international peace emissaries from both EU and 
UN that any hopes the international community had of shepherding them 
back into a Yugoslav confederation had died with the bloodshed since the 
end of June.  That bloodshed was of course intensifying in late October, 1991, 
and so the Bosnian President’s equivocal stance towards Yugoslav institutions 
including therefore the JNA did not encourage confidence on the part of the 
Croats in his republic.  He told the US ambassador that he supported the 
continued presence of the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina because “there are too 
many armed civilians  around here.”46
In conversation with the US ambassador Izetbegović himself was prepared 
to discuss the possibility of partitioning Bosnia between its three main con-
stituent peoples, though he doubted  the viability of such a solution: “It might 
be a good idea if it were possible, but it’s not possible because the populations 
are too mixed.”47 
Even after the end of the conflict the former High Representative, Carl 
Bildt, raised the question of alternatives:
“I asked him [Izetbegović] the question which I had been on the verge of 
posing so many times before: would it not have been possible to avoid the war? 
Look what happened after two million people were driven from their homes, 
I said, with hundreds of thousands killed and a country in ruins.  Would it not 
have been possible to agree at the negotiating table in 1992 on something that 
might have been better than this?…  Was there not a window of opportunity 
in 1992 when the Serbs had been ready to accept an independent Bosnia in 
exchange for some sort of internal autonomy? Hadn’t there been such a deal 
in Lisbon in the first months of that fateful year? He didn’t really reply.”48
President Izetbegović told me in November, 1996, that as late as  February, 
1992, during a conversation  à deux with Slobodan Milošević, the Serbian 
President  had offered him constitutional guarantees and the number two slot 
in a revised Yugoslavia if he would agree to oppose Bosnian independence. 
The fact that President Izetbegović rejected this particular offer does not alter 
45 See W. ZIMMERMANN, ibid., 173.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Carl BILDT, Peace Journey. The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia, Weidenfeld & Nicolson: 
London, 1998, 365-66.
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the fact that very late in the day, he was still prepared to discuss some alterna-
tive to the declaration of a sovereign and independent Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  It would have been irresponsible to do otherwise, but certainly 
to envisage alternatives to the actual outcome was not inherently treasonable 
or conspiratorial.  
In retrospect, Ambassador Zimmermann concluded: “I have  no doubt 
that Milošević and Karadžić had already decided to annex the majority of 
Bosnian territory by force.  But the [European] Community’s irresponsibility, 
the United States’ passivity, and  Izetbegović’s  miscalculation made their job 
easier.”49
Influential US foreign policy analysts advocated population transfers as 
the solution to the Bosnian, indeed Yugoslav, problem.  Charles Maynes, the 
editor Foreign Policy  explicitly invoked the involuntary as well as voluntary 
population transfers earlier in Twentieth Century European history.  Maynes 
endorsed both the forcible expulsion of German-speakers from Poland 
and Czechoslovakia (Maynes might have added hundreds of thousands of 
Germans from Tito’s Yugoslavia too) as well as the Greek-Turkish post-
Lausanne exchanges as the way peace had been secured between formerly 
antagonistic neighbours.50
Some Croats like Anto Valenta, an activist in both HDZ BiH and the HVO 
in Vitez argued in favour of ethnically homogenous cantons on the Swiss 
model.  Theses cantons would be both part of BiH and at the same time self-
governing.  Valenta rejected the arguments of both Serbs and Croats (includ-
ing his own leader Franjo Tudjman!) who tried to see the Bosnian Muslims as 
essentially Serbian or Croatian. 
Yet, as we have seen,  at Karadjordjevo in 1991 even a truncated Banovina 
was hardly acceptable to Serb leadership in Belgrade.  Nor was it later to Pale. 
It would give too much to Croatia at times when the Serbs felt they could gain 
much more for themselves by force. 
Sometimes, stress is laid on the fact that  in 1991-92, by no means all 
Bosnian Croats or Serbs supported their majority parties, the HDZ in the 
Croat case.  There is an argument that without the violent onslaught of the 
Bosnian Serb forces and the accompanying ethnic cleansing, the emergence 
of nationalist self-identity as Croat, Muslim or Serb rather than citizen of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina would not have achieved the degree of polarisation 
subsequently seen.  This may well be true.  However, it is misleading to see 
evidence of Croatian support for Sarajevo-centred institutions as an instinc-
tive loyalty to Bosnia-Herzegovina as a natural unit.  On the contrary, it was 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s reality as a mini-Yugoslavia which made it attractive to 
such people.  Most Croat (and Serb) “loyalists” were in reality nostalgics for 
old Yugoslavia.  This point seems to be implicit in Dr. Malcolm’s statement 
that “Once Yugoslavia had ceased to exist, the very same fact which made the 
49 See W. ZIMMERMANN, ibid., 178.
50 See Charles MAYNES, “Containing Ethnic Conflict” in Foreign Policy, Winter, 1992-93, 7-11.
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preservation of Bosnia difficult — its nationally mixed population — also 
made it imperative.”51 
Nostalgia for Tito’s state was not something shared by the majority of 
Croats in 1991-92 who had backed the HDZ.  In their eyes it was a suspicious 
if not downright treasonable emotion.  The fact that many Croats who backed 
the Izetbegović-led government fully would be known to other Croats as nos-
talgics for Tito’s Yugoslavia coloured their attitude towards the Muslim major-
ity there.  After all even Muslims sometimes accused people in Izetbegović’s 
immediate entourage either of Yugo-sympathies or being KOS agents.  The 
fact that Serbian media accused the same people of being Islamic fundamen-
talists and agents of the Green Revolution only illustrates how emotions had 
taken over rational insight to an even greater extent on the Serbian side. 
The dominance of one-sided pro-Muslim views even in academic litera-
ture is epitomised by Professor Michael Sells claim that “By the summer of 
1993, …. the underarmed Bosnian army fought back; as the HVO retreated, 
many Croats fled Travnik to HVO-controlled territory.  In many cases it was 
the HVO that forced Croats to leave areas controlled by the Bosnian army…” 
[emphasis added]52  How the HVO could force people “to leave areas control-
led” by their enemies is far from clear.  
Croatian attitudes to Bosnian Muslims had never been as negative as 
among Serbs as we have seen, but it is true to say that in the later twentieth 
century fear of Islamic fundamentalism has been fostered far and wide not 
least by the government and media of  our contemporary classic civil society, 
the United States of America.  
A narrow focus on words attributed to President Tudjman for instance 
overlooks how far late twentieth century hostility towards perceived Muslim 
fundamentalism was by no means confined to the Balkans.  US media, for 
instance, are notorious for their stereotyping of Arabs/Muslims as terrorists 
and the classic modern “Other”.  Like all prejudices, it is invisible to the holder 
of the preconception.  It is a matter taken for granted. (Of course anti-Croat 
prejudices function in a similar way.)  British ministers in this period (1990-
95) uttered anti-Bosnian sentiments taking it for granted that they were allies 
of Islamic extremism from Iran and Lebanon.  Any concerns that President 
Tudjman expressed about Islamic penetration into the Balkans were far from 
distancing him from the Western mainstream. 
It is also worth recalling that Yugoslavia’s Muslims had expressed hostility 
to the Gulf War and the presence of Muslim forces in the US-led coalition 
against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.53 
51 N. MALCOLM, ibid., 235.
52 See Michael A. SELLS, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, University of 
California Press: Berkeley, 1996, 101.
53 20 January, 1991 See Francine FRIEDMAN, The Bosnian Muslims. Denial of a Nation, 
Westview Press:  Boulder, Co., 1996, 234, note 106.
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7. The Vance-Owen Plan 
The Prosecution argues that “The Bosnian Croat leadership interpreted the 
peace plan as assigning certain municipalities within the Hz H-B exclusively 
to them…” This is seen as peculiarly criminal.  Emphasis is often placed on 
Defence Minister Šušak’s visit to Travnik in April, 1993, as the event which 
precipitated Muslim-Croat fighting.  Šušak apparently objected to the lack of 
a Croatian flag to fly alongside the Bosnian flag.  He emphasised that Travnik 
had been assigned by the Vance-Owen Plan to a Croatian canton.54  He was 
not alone in using such language. 
Sadly, the cantons were regularly referred too by ethno-religious titles as 
Serbian, Croatian or Muslim by the authors themselves of the Plan.  Locals on 
the ground may be forgiven for thinking that the cantons were meant to be 
exclusively the domain of one ethno-religious group if the elder statesmen of 
the world community glibly describe them that way.  
Already on 3rd November, 1992, Lord Owen told British television viewers: 
“The idea of having provinces….is a way of ensuring that some of those prov-
inces may be Muslim-controlled…Obviously [sic] some will be Croatian, some 
Serbian …”55 [Emphasis added] Given such authoritative statements it would 
hardly be surprising if some people on all sides took the Vance-Owen Plan 
as carte blanche for establishing their domination of “their” cantons.  Lord 
Owen’s loose language bears a heavy share of the responsibility for the fight-
ing once the VOP was announced. 
Lord Owen routinely characterised the government in Sarajevo not as 
representative of a multi-ethnic Bosnia but as Muslim.  For instance, on 15th 
April, 1993, Lord Owen referred to “the Bosnian government, the Muslims…” 
during a television interview.56  In fact, both the central Bosnian government 
and the proposed “Croat” or “Muslim” canton administrations (to use Owen’s 
terms) had minority representatives high up in their administrative structure. 
It was Lord Owen’s rhetoric which seemed to undercut the agreed structures 
as much as anything else.  
His official spokesman, John Mills, whom we must accept as voicing Lord 
Owen’s considered views, expressly sought to blackmail participants in the 
international mediation effort with threats of annihilation.  Mills stated pub-
licly in July, 1993: “The message to the Muslims [sic] is negotiate or perish [my 
emphasis]…”57  
54  See Washington Post 20th April, 1993, and the RFE/RL Research Report Supplement (19th 
-23rd April, 1993), 12.
55 Interview on Channel Four News, quoted in M. ALMOND, Europe’s Backyard War: The War 
in the Balkans, Heinemann: London, 1994, 303.
56 Interview on Channel 4 News, Channel 4 (UK) (7p.m., 15th April, 1993).
57 See The  Times (28th July, 1993) as quoted, in M. ALMOND, ibid., 317.
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The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan was even more explicit in sanctifying  a three-
way ethno-religious division of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The language of both 
mediators was also sloppy at best. 
The Plan had divisive effects even within communities.  When the largely 
Muslim Bosnian Parliament rejected the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan on 29th 
September, 1993, Fikret Abdić used this as an excuse for his mini-region of 
Velika Kladusa to secede from BiH and to cooperate openly with Serb forces 
around Bihać including those in the Croatian Krajina.58 
Not all Muslims accepted even the Vance-Owen Plan.  Even their President 
had delayed signing up until 25th March, 1993, but more significantly the 
Sarajevo newspaper, Ljiljan published a map allocating the central Bosnian 
municipalities of Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca, Bugojno, and Gornji 
Vakuf to Muslim control rather than canton 10.  Whatever the authority of 
the Ljiljan line, Croats took it as a sign that the Muslims had a strategic goal to 
control that region as part of their ethnically-defined territory.59 
The fact that some on all sides seem to have seen the cantons — with 
implicit encouragement from the mediators — as their own territory raises 
the question of whether the Muslim forces initiated offensives in Central 
Bosnia just to gain territory at Croats’ expense or to scupper Vance-Owen 
Plan even if Serbs signed up. 
With the exception of the extremely unfavourable Cuteilhero Plan, the 
Croatian side (HDZ) accepted all peace plans.  Dr. Malcolm notes of the 
March, 1992, proposals by  the EC which pressed very strongly for a modified 
version of the Serb map of cantonisation to be accepted, that “The plan was at 
first accepted by all three sides as the basis for further negotiations; then the 
Croat HDZ  rejected it on 24 March, followed by Izetbegović’s party, the SDA, 
on the next day.  That the Croats rejected it first is not surprising, since it gave 
them only 17 per cent of Bosnian territory and left 59 per cent of the Croat 
population in non-Croat cantons.”60
8. The False Comparison between Republika Srpska and Herceg-Bosna
Underlying the Prosecution case is a false and misleading comparison 
between the status of so-called Republika Srpska and its leadership and that of 
so-called Herceg-Bosna.  Leaving aside the irony that the Bosnian Serb vice-
president, Biljana Plavsić remains un-indicted despite her rank and her racist 
language encouraging genocide against Muslims (language condemned even 
by President Milošević’s wife!), the chronology of events makes the distinction 
clear.
Bosnian Serbs had begun to create their Unions of Municipalities in spring, 
1991.  The Bosnian Krajina was set up on 10th April, 1991.
58 See C. BENNETT, ibid., 201-202., for the various “unnatural” inter-ethnic permutations.
59 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reprint of 3rd August, 1993. 
60 See N. MALCOLM, ibid., 233.
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Croatian HZ Bosanska Posavina and HZ Herceg-Bosna were only created 
on 12th November and 18th November, 1991, respectively. 
Unlike Republika Srpska which presented itself to the world as an inde-
pendent sovereign state and established diplomatic relations with (equally 
pariah) statelets like Transnistria (The Moldovan Autonomous Soviet 
Republic) and Abkhazia, Herceg-Bosna did not secede from the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  If the commonplace setting of Republika Srpska and 
Herceg-Bosna as equivalents had been the case, a declaration of independ-
ence and separate international status would surely have been a natural step. 
Even before the Washington Agreement in March, 1994, Herceg-Bosna 
did not deny its status as part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Its leaders disputed 
what the Sarajevo government was doing in the name of the whole republic 
and considered themselves as acting in the interests of the Croatian part of 
the population.  Unlike Republika Srpska which defied Slobodan Milošević’s 
support for international peace plans, Herceg-Bosna’s leaders accepted all the 
plans and the US-mediated Washington Agreement to set up the so-called 
Muslim-Croat Federation. 
Criticism of the Herceg-Bosnian entity for acting on the rights bestowed 
on the Croatian entity(ies) by the Vance-Owen or Owen-Stoltenberg Plans 
seems misdirected.  The international community cannot have it both ways. 
If its authorised representatives proposed (usually on a take-it or leave-it basis 
— albeit more than once)  that Bosnia-Herzegovina’s integrity and unity was 
to be radically altered, why should it be criminal or treasonable for local com-
munities to act along the lines proposed by the UN, EC/EU, OSCE authorised 
mediators?61 
The changes in the leadership of the HDZ HB in winter 1991 have been 
attributed to a conspiracy to promote the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
between Croatia and Serbia.  Whatever President Tudjman’s influence on the 
changes — it was probably decisive — the changes were far less productive of 
dramatic change than implied by the prosecution.  After all, Professor Donia 
himself admits that “Kljuić’s  departure led subsequently to the selection of 
Milenko Brkiæ as head of the HDZ-BiH.  Brkić also supported an integral 
Bosnia and Croat loyalty to it [my emphasis]”62  Why did Tudjman wait until 
November,  1992 to force the Herceg-Bosna HDZ to accept Boban, whom 
Donia describes63 as a “loyal follower of Tudjman and an advocate of territo-
rial separatism.”  If it had been Tudjman’s intention to carry through a parti-
tion of Bosnia all along why didn’t he act earlier.
61 See Prosecutor 47 on separate legislation for Herceg-Bosna: It is hard to disagree with Dr. 
Ribičič’s general point that “The Owen-Stoltenberg plan, which satisfied the interests of both 
Serbs and Croats… went even further than Vance-Owen because it envisaged three distinct 
entities, rather than a number of cantons under a central authority….” 
62 See page 137 in this volume.
63 Ibid. 
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To understand the outbreak of Muslim-Croat violence in 1993 it is neces-
sary to recall the parlous situation of the Bosnian government by spring, 1993, 
as the Bosnian Serb forces threatened to capture Srebrenica.  
In turn, this offensive drove Muslims into Central Bosnia.  Drago Hedl, one 
of Tudjman’s fiercest critics in the Croatian press as a regular columnist on 
Feral Tribune noted that “[Mate] Boban, aware that he could get more than 
he had hoped for, accepted the Vance-Owen cantonisation plan for Bosnia 
without a moment’s hesitation… forgetting that Serbian conquest and ethnic 
cleansing had led to mass Muslim flight from the aggressor and into HVO-
controlled territory.... ”64 Hedl added:
 “The establishment of Croatian authority in the canton areas stipu-
lated to be Croat under the Vance-Owen plan did not always occur 
without opposition.  Boban could not resist the temptation of ‘a little 
bit of ethnic cleansing’ on his own territory, and this provoked a coun-
ter reaction by Muslim forces.  Suddenly in a majority in places where 
formerly they had not been and feeling the rapid dwindling of their 
overall living space, Muslims turned on Croats [emphasis added].  The 
fragile alliance was broken, wide-spread atrocities occurred on both 
sides… ” 65 
Hedl argued that Tudjman had given up hope of recovering Serb-occupied 
Croatian territory and “may have thought that, at some future negotiations, 
the Croatian part of Bosnia might be considered a proper return for the lost 
territories of eastern Slavonia and Baranja, which it will be very difficult to 
retrieve [emphasis added].”66
Writing in 1993 like other anti-Tudjman journalists and activists Hedl 
regarded the Croatian President as defeatist in his attitude to Serbian military 
gains in Croatia and Bosnia. In December, 1994, in Zagreb, now in opposition 
Stipe Mesic who had played a key role in the rise of Mate Boban as Tudjman’s 
emissary two years earlier attacked the Croatian President’s passivity in my 
hearing. 
It is important to note that anti-Tudjman politicians and journalists in 
Croatia regularly denounced his feebleness in regard to reversing Serbian 
conquests.  It was his lack of nationalist resolve that they baited — until 
August, 1995.  Far from pursuing an aggressive policy, he was accused of 
appeasement. 
Croatia itself continued to co-operate with the UN despite widespread 
unhappiness in the country at what most Croats perceived as the UN’s tilting 
away from any enforcement of resolution guaranteeing Croatian sovereign 
control over territory then under Krajina Serb control.  What is striking is 
how far President Tudjman continued to co-operate with the UN and its 
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mediator Cyrus Vance even after the successful recovery of the strategically 
vital Maslenica Bridge and its environs by the Croatian armed forces between 
23-25th January, 1993. 
Only 15% of Croats polled approved of President Tudjman’s signing of an 
agreement to allow UN forces to police the area and supervise the reconstruc-
tion of a permanent bridge after the operation.  Only 36% trusted the UN 
to actually carry out the repair work. 50% regarded the pact as a “failure for 
Croatian policy.” One commentator noted that “In accepting Resolution 815 
and the Geneva Agreement to implement Resolution 802, the Croatian gov-
ernment seems aware it has compromised itself on key national issues.”67  
Even Zimmermann’s negative portrait of Tudjman has to admit that when 
asked to make restitution to the Zagreb Jewish community for the destruction 
of its synagogue by the Ustashe during the war, “to our surprise, he promised 
to do this.  He kept that promise. [emphasis added]”68  “[Tudjman] listened to 
Western expressions of concern, and he often did something about them, even 
when he saw no clear interest.”69  In other words, far from pursuing a consist-
ently defiant attitude either to the UN or Western countries, Tudjman was 
very cooperative. 
It is constantly forgotten today how far it was the opposition to President 
Tudjman which demanded aggressive military action against the Serbs. 
Tudjman was decried for playing along with the international community 
and not asserting Croatian interests by force if necessary.  After Tudjman’s 
Blitzkriegs in May and August, 1995, which recovered Western Slavonia and 
Krajina his opponents shifted to accusing him of being too aggressive.  
9. Central Bosnia
Though proclaimed part of Herceg-Bosna, the Croat-inhabited parts of 
Central Bosnia were in a very different situation from Herzegovina.
Media focus on the siege of Mostar, with all the hardships and death inflict-
ed on the largely Muslim population trapped in the eastern quarter of the city, 
distorted the relative balance of power by emphasising the superiority of the 
Croatian forces and the relative helplessness of the Muslims (who certainly 
were in a grim position in Mostar).  However, elsewhere the balance of power 
and the military initiative did not exclusively favour the Croatian side.
As a by-product of Serbian advances and concomitant ethnic cleansing, 
large numbers of Muslims (including troops and para-militaries) were pushed 
westwards into areas traditionally inhabited by Croatian majorities, especially 
in Central Bosnia. 
67 See Patrick MOORE, “The Shaky Truce in Croatia” in RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 2 No. 21 
(21st May, 1993), 48 - 49.
68 W. ZIMMERMANN, ibid., 74.
69 Ibid., 77.
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These Muslim refugees were certainly victims of Serb aggression, but their 
response  to it was not necessarily admirable.  Driven from their homes, they 
regarded the Croats among whom they now found themselves as lucky to 
have escaped their fate and as possessors of property and economic means 
which aroused their envy and resentment.  
Unlike the Muslim refugees, the local Croats had no direct experience of 
warfare and were less well-prepared for its outbreak than the already organ-
ised BiH forces and para-militaries who had arrived in their areas from Serb-
conquered zones of Bosnia. 
At Vitez, the HVO had its only significant munitions factory in Bosnia. 
Loss of control of the explosives manufacturing plant would have had pro-
found political as well as military implications.  The BiH Army’s offensive no 
doubt made sense from a Muslim point of view but for Croats it was a deeply 
sinister development.  If it had proved successful, in all probability a wave of 
Croat refugees fleeing south-westwards would have preceded the arrival of 
the Muslim refugees in the baggage train of the Army of BiH.  
It has been alleged (with some basis in evidence) that the interpreters and 
local personnel employed by Britbat as well as other international agencies 
and NGOs in the area came predominantly from a Muslim background. 
Emotional entanglements between (male) officers and (female) locally-
employed staff from one group could well have distorted perceptions of 
developments.  
Conflict between Muslims and Croats was fortuitous for the international 
community, since it complicated the picture of what was happening and made 
the argument that the locals were incorrigibly quarrelsome and unworthy of 
Western assistance much more plausible.70  The debate continued, with both 
Bosnian hawks and doves volubly articulating their proposals and trepida-
tions.  The extent to which one’s image of the adversary and the conflict 
dynamics influenced policy proposals was evident in mid-April 1993, after a 
renewed outbreak of intense fighting between Bosnian Croats and Muslims. 
While  Croat-Muslim clashes had been underreported up to that point, the 
April 16 massacre in the village of Ahmici received prominent coverage in 
the international media.  Underscoring the three-way nature of the Bosnian 
war, the Ahmici attack reinforced the views of those who argued that no 
foreign intervention in a civil war could force three ethnic ethnic groups to 
live together in one state, and thus anything but humanitarian assistance was 
futile.” [emphasis added] 
The Ahmici massacre was a crucial event.  Its timing was highly significant. 
Although the BBC film of evidence of the Ahmici massacre was taken on 16th 
April, 1993 (as the time-codes visible on the broadcast clips showed), it was 
not actually broadcast until 21st April.  I  have seen no explanation of why it 
took so long for the dramatic and undoubtedly newsworthy film to reach our 
70 See Sanya POPOVIĆ, “Debating Operation Quagmire Storm: U.S. Crisis Management in 
Bosnia” in edited by Raju C.G. Thomas & H. Richard Friman, The South Slav Conflict: History, 
Religion, Ethnicity and Nationalism, Garland: New York, 1996, 302.
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screens.  The delay was particularly odd since live interviews were possible 
with Colonel Stewart of the Cheshire Regiment on the BBC-1 6 p.m.  News on 
21st  April when he told viewers  “It is almost impossible for us to establish” the 
scale and responsibility of the massacre. 
In the days running up to the discovery and publicity circus surrounding 
the Ahmici massacre, the Serb offensive around Srebrenica had put reluctant 
Western governments, especially the British one, under pressure to use mili-
tary force to prevent Serb gains.  It was certainly convenient that more than 
one villain should appear on stage to muddy the Bosnian waters. 
The headline writers in London linked Croat atrocities with Serb ones 
around Srebrenica to make the parallel clear.71  Anchorman Jon Snow began 
the 7 p.m.  Channel 4 News:  “Good evening.  If proof were needed that all eth-
nic communities are equally capable of committing atrocities in Bosnia what 
has happened in and around Vitez in the last 48 hours has provided it.  At least 
200 civilians have been killed in cold blood… This as Muslims in Srebrenica 
gave up their arms to Canadian UN troops…”72
Later in the same programme Mr. Snow asked Cedric Thornberry of the 
UN, “Now that it is so clear that all ethnic communities are perpetrating 
appalling atrocities and that there is no simple argument between Bosnia and 
Serbia or Bosnia and Croatia everybody is at it.  Isn’t the Vance-Owen map 
providing the basic clue [clearly he meant cue] to the ethnic cleansing.  People 
are ethnically cleansing their way through the map.” 
Peter Snow  introduced BBC’s Newsnight programme announcing, 
“Evidence that the Serbs alone cannot be blamed for the atrocities sweeping 
Bosnia comes tonight from the town of Vitez.  British troops there have evi-
dence of  Muslims being executed by Croats in widespread ethnic cleansing… 
The Croats now look just as bad as the Serbs…”73  The Croats are taking it out 
on the Muslims… right on the threshold of British military headquarters…”
Colonel Stewart told the programme that his troops saw “normally a whole 
family gunned down by someone or other…”74  At this stage Col. Stewart made 
no precise charges of responsibility.
Nik Gowing talked of “drunken brawls turning into all out ethnic cleans-
ing”75 but then — without explanation — claimed “The presence of Croat 
armoured vehicles  and artillery  underlines how premeditated  and politically 
motivated this viciousness is.  There are summary executions and reprisal 
[emphasis added] killings.  British warrior vehicles are… removing casualties 
of ethnic cleansing by both sides [emphasis added].”  Although the tenor of 
this report was critical of the Croats it nonetheless included points and com-
71 See ITN 5.40 p.m. and BBC 1 6 p.m. on 21st April, 1993.
72 Channel 4 News, 7 p.m., 21st April, 1993.
73 BBC 2 Newsnight, 10.30 p.m., 21st April, 1993. 
74  BBC 2 Newsnight, 10.30 p.m. 21st April, 1993.
75 Channel 4 News, 21st April, 1993.
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ments which countered the argument that the violence was premeditated and 
politically co-ordinated by the Croatian leadership.  
“Reprisal killings” implies that Muslims had attacked or committed killings 
first.  
Mike Smart told viewers of the One O’Clock News on  BBC 1 on 22nd April, 
1993, that “Evidence of atrocities in Central Bosnia where British troops can 
do little more than recover the bodies underlines the difficulty of identifying 
aggressors.” The British Defence Secretary,  Malcolm Rifkind, used the Ahmici 
massacre to justify opposing both air strikes to lift the Serb sieges of Sarajevo 
and Srebrenica and lifting the arms embargo.  He told the same programme: 
“What will be the results of arming the Bosnian Muslims because we see in 
central Bosnia a new conflict and a new set of atrocities between Croats and 
Muslims…”
Rifkind added “In the case of raising an embargo once you start supplying 
arms to people you have control of how these arms are going  used...  If  in 
fact they were used to commit atrocities against civilians on the other side you 
would be in a very difficult dilemma.” 
The name Ahmici was only specifically mentioned for the first time on 
23rd April, 1993.76  Col. Stewart was shown declaring,  “Some swine, someone 
set fire to the cellar”  Then he confronted a local  HVO representative (as 
described by the reporter) and demanded to know, “Who has done it? Who is 
responsible?”  
In the days before the discovery of the Ahmici massacre, the crisis at 
Srebrenica was growing.  On 15th April, the Muslim authorities in Srebrenica 
refused to let the UNHCR evacuate more than 2,000 civilians from the 
besieged town for fear that any further evacuation would make it easier for 
the international community to abandon the town to its fate.  Prime Minister 
John Major came under pressure from the opposition leaders John Smith and 
Paddy Ashdown (Liberal Democrat) and his predecessor Lady Thatcher.  In a 
speech before the broadcasting of news of the Ahmici Massacre,  John Smith 
said, “I believe that it is now necessary for the United Nations to issue an ulti-
matum to Serbia that unless a ceasefire is made effective the United Nations 
will authorise air strikes against Serbian lines of communication in Bosnia-
Hercegovina.”77  The UN Secretary-General’s representative on the ground in 
Bosnia Cedric Thornberry accused General Mladić explicitly of “genocide” 
and lying to the UN.78  
Even Lord Owen was talking about “a legitimate use of force” and reminded 
viewers of the ITN news that he had advocated air strikes in 1992 before 
becoming EC peace mediator.79  The UN  Security Council had just declared 
Srebrenica to be a “safe area”.  The coincidence of the discovery of the Ahmici 
76 ITN 12.30 p.m., 23rd April, 1993.
77 BBC 1 news 5:10 pm (17th April, 1993).
78 See Channel Four News 7 p.m., 15th April, 1993.
79 See ITN, 12:30 p,m., 16th April, 1993.
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Massacre with the crescendo of international concern about the fate of 
Srebrenica and the dilemma posed especially to the British government as the 
major force provider for UNPROFOR along with France was painfully obvi-
ous at the time in April, 1993.  
It is too simplistic to present the Muslims only as victims.  Certainly 
Muslims may have been disproportionately victims, but their political and 
military leaders were capable of undertaking military operations which flout-
ed the normal rules of war.  Perhaps they could argue — as others did — that 
necessity justified their actions but on reflection outside observers should not 
ignore these actions by the Muslim forces.
The formation of the Muslim-Croat Federation at the behest of the United 
States on 18th March, 1994, did not resolve all the tensions.  For instance, in 
March, 1995, the Bosnian Croat General Vlado Santić was kidnapped by 
Bosnian Muslim troops.80  It would be wrong to attribute all the faults to the 
Croats.  The record shows otherwise. 
Any understanding of the tragic events of mid-April, 1993, cannot take at 
face value the assertions of any of the participants.  All of them — including 
quite clearly the British military participants in UNPROFOR — had, and may 
well still have, political agendas of their own.  Bias there was certainly enough 
on all sides.  To privilege the testimony of any one set of participants as ex 
officio reliable is to fly in the face of the evidence. 
80 See the New York Times 17th March,  1995.
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